


























































































Civilizational analysis and the problem of 
contingency 
* Göttingen University 
COMCAD Arbeitspapiere - Working Papers 
General Editor: Thomas Faist 
No. 82, 2010 































Civilizational Analysis and the Problem of Contingency  
Bielefeld: COMCAD, 2010  
(General Editor: Thomas Faist; Working Papers – Centre on Migration, Citizenship and 
Development; 82) 
The COMCAD Working Paper Series is intended to aid the rapid distribution of work in 
progress, research findings and special lectures by researchers and associates of COMCAD. 
Papers aim to stimulate discussion among the worldwide community of scholars, 
policymakers and practitioners. They are distributed free of charge in PDF format via the 
COMCAD website. 
The opinions expressed in the papers are solely those of the author/s who retain the 
copyright. Comments on individual Working Papers are welcomed, and should be directed to 
the author/s. 
University of Bielefeld 
Faculty of Sociology 









In the field of the comparative study of civilizations especially authors of the so-called Cali-
fornia School, notably and most convincingly Kenneth Pomeranz, have argued that the Eng-
lish industrial revolution and – as a consequence – the rise of the West and the falling back 
of China were the results of rather contingent processes. The industrial revolution in Eng-
land, in this view, was not some kind of a logical end-result of historical processes that have 
started many centuries before 1760 as authors from Max Weber up to the majority of current 
Western sociologists will want to make us belief by pointing to typical Western societal fea-
tures like the Roman law tradition, a particular work ethic or a particular form of the state-
system. Pomeranz and others, in contrast, have forcefully argued that only easily accessible 
mineral resources like coal and a particular type of colonies made it possible that England 
and not China had the chance of an early industrial take-off. But it could have happened oth-
erwise! China could have been the first industrial giant, if – so Pomeranz’s argument goes – 
only some contingent conditions would have been different. 
I will not discuss the spectacular and certainly not uncontested arguments of Kenneth Pom-
eranz and those scholars who have followed his lead. My point is rather a methodological 
one since I believe that the role of contingency in the field of macro-sociology in general and 
in civilizational analysis in particular has been underestimated or misunderstood. My claim is 
that most or even all research which seriously tries to trace social and historical processes in 
some respect deals with contingency. Many of the great books of the social sciences implic-
itly or explicitly use some kind of a path-dependent argument in which some contingent initial 
conditions have led regions, countries or civilizations towards very different outcomes. 
Whether it was – in the case of Max Weber – the role of the Protestant Reformation which 
laid the tracks for modern capitalism, whether it was – in the case of Barrington Moore – the 
solution of the agrarian question which led either to democratic or to totalitarian political sys-
tems or whether it was – in the case of Shmuel Eisenstadt – the axial age which led to cer-
tain types of social and political conflicts and particular societal dynamics: In all those exam-
ples a contingent founding moment is at the centre of the story: A contingent event (or “turn-
ing point”) initiates a path-dependent, often highly deterministic development. In some re-
spect all these authors use arguments of path dependence and thus – quoting James Ma-
honey – must deal with the following problem: certainly one of the most sophisticated authors 
within the debate on path-dependence: “The identification of path dependence (...) involves 
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both tracing a given outcome back to a particular set of historical events, and showing how 
these events are themselves contingent occurrences that cannot be explained on the basis 
of prior historical conditions. Because the presence or absence of contingency cannot be 
established independent of theory, the specification of path dependence is always a theory-
laden process.” (Mahoney 2000, 507/08) Note, that Mahoney is not making a claim about the 
contingent or determined character of reality. His claim is not an ontological one. His argu-
ment is rather that social scientists do construct theories with which some facts – the contin-
gent event which triggers the development – cannot be explained by the theory being used in 
explaining the path-dependent process. It is not the event in itself which is contingent; it is 
the event being theorized within a particular paradigm which appears to be contingent. Thus, 
a contingent event or a “turning point” is created by the theoretical paradigm being used. Or, 
as I would put it: The talk of “contingent events”, of “path-dependent developments”, or “turn-
ing points” is just part or element of a (theoretical) narrative, of a “theoretical” story. If that is 
true, then the specific features of narratives and stories have to be taken seriously while do-
ing macro-sociological research on civilizations. To formulate it in a more critical way: Only 
very few authors acknowledge the methodological challenges connected with the phenome-
non of contingency. Contingency – so my argument goes – forces scholars especially within 
the field of civilizational analysis follow at least four methodological postulates that are 
closely connected however. 
1. Every narrative strategy requires the selection of events and structures for setting 
up a convincing “plot”. And these events and structures have to be brought into a temporal 
order so that the reader – as David Maines (1993, 21) has pointed out – gets some insight 
into the “tempo, duration, and pace” of the process under consideration. This seems to be 
trivial, but does in fact have enormous methodological consequences which are often ne-
glected. Since the contingent event, the founding moment, the turning point is often consid-
ered as the most important element of a (theoretical) story, scholars often implicitly ascribe 
these events and moments some kind of a „genetic code“ as Michel Dobry has put it: The 
contingent event or turning point is exclusively considered from the perspective of the end 
result of the path-dependent process so as if the contingent event already contains the seeds 
of the developments still to come. Thus a strong teleological element enters the whole theo-
retical construction. When this is the case then it oftentimes doesn’t seem necessary any 
more to describe the sequence of the events in detail. Since the “plot” is exclusively created 
from the point of the end-result of a particular process, some kind of a deterministic devel-
opment is implied making a serious analysis of “tempo (...) and pace“ superfluous. 
Such teleological and deterministic assumptions can be found in Eisenstadt’s work when he 
tries to describe the trajectories of civilizations after the Axial Age: After the triggering event 
of the invention of transcendence the reader gets the idea that the cultural tracks of a particu-
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lar civilization are laid down once and forever so that the outcomes of civilizational processes 
are somewhat predetermined. Such a problematic impression is supported not the least by 
Eisenstadt’s own talk of “cultural programs” (kulturelle Programme) that supposedly shape 
civilizations (cf. Eisenstadt 2000, 15ff.). 
With respect to this particular problem my argument would be as follows: In order to avoid 
teleological constructions, a detailed analysis of the tempo and pace of a path-dependent 
process is absolutely necessary. However, can this be really successfully done within civili-
zational analysis that often covers hundreds or even thousands of years? Is it really possible 
to demonstrate that there is a kind of (cultural) logic that propels the dynamics of civilizations 
from the very beginning of their existence? I have some doubts about that. The shorter the 
time span of a story, the easier it is to give the details of the tempo and pace of the path-
dependent process. Therefore I would argue that one should be sceptical towards construc-
tions which try to bridge hundreds or even thousands of years between the beginning and 
the end of a process. I don’t think that one can really convincingly demonstrate the continua-
tion of mechanisms that last such a long time-period. It is simply questionable whether the 
claims being made in such huge stories can really be demonstrated in a non-speculative 
way. 
2. Path-dependent analyses often focus rather exhaustively on the starting point of a 
development. There are some good reasons for such a focus, of course, but it must not be 
forgotten that also the end of such a development has to be justified by theoretical means. 
The end of a path-dependent process – like its beginning – cannot be found in reality but is 
also a part of a narrative construction. Only a clear statement in regard of the explanandum 
of the research question makes it possible to give plausible reasons concerning the end-
point of a social process. Now, this also sounds rather trivial. 
However, one has to be aware that a majority of path-dependent analyses often only regard 
two “turning points”, one, with which the path begins, and one with which it ends and a new 
and different path might emerge. All too rarely the question is asked whether in between 
these two “turning points” there might be other events of interest, even other possible turning 
points which could make it possible to tell a completely different theoretical story, to see a 
completely different path. And – in addition – all too rarely still another question is really dealt 
with, namely whether the originally discovered “turning” and “end-points” might be consid-
ered as merely intermediate stops of a development which in fact bridges a much larger time 
period as the originally created path-dependent story was intended to do (Haydu 1998, 353): 
Thus, what right now might look like some kind of a starting point of a development could be 
– using another theoretical framework – also be regarded as the end of a path or its con-
tinuation. If that is true, then it is some kind of a methodological necessity to question ones 
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own narrative constructions by continuously reconsidering alternative plots concerning differ-
ent paths. 
This is particularly relevant for civilizational analysis since in a very odd way this type of re-
search sometimes has a kind of a-historical touch – despite all historical ambitions! It seems 
too tempting to construct the “problématique” of the Axial Age (800-200 B.C.) from the 
standpoint of the present period, to contrast – let’s say – Chinese and Western (Christian) 
civilizations as seen in the year 2010. But would such a reconstruction have been different if 
done in the 1980s? I think, it would! And this is so not because we nowadays know much 
more about historical details. Today (2010) it is simply not convincing any longer to recon-
struct the contours of the Axial Age in China in the same way as that was done by Eisenstadt 
in the 1980s. Too much has changed concerning our picture of the possible dynamics within 
Chinese culture and civilization – which leaves only one conclusion: One should either avoid 
to bridge such long historical periods (that was my first point) and/or one should at least think 
about various (i.e. more than two) turning points in history in order not to fall into teleological 
traps. 
3. My discussion concerning the theoretical justification of starting- and end-points of 
developments immediately brings up the question of the truth content of path-dependent 
analyses. Within the institutionalist debate of the last decade it has been criticized that most 
authors have assumed some kind of a hyper stability of a path once taken. For example, it 
was assumed that the structures of the so-called Rhenish Capitalism in Germany have been 
fixed in such a rigid way that a real change seems impossible. Yet, change has come – as 
Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen in the field of political economy have argued – even if 
only by incremental steps. Thus assumptions concerning stability of paths have turned out to 
be highly problematic. And I would like to suggest that this must have consequences for civi-
lizational analysis as well. Thus we are forced to answer the question how and by what 
means it is possible to substantiate the truth content of narratives. 
Narratives cannot produce their own truths; they can only be made plausible by being sup-
ported by good arguments (Büthe 2002, 488). As should be clear, this doesn’t invalidate nar-
ratives as a methodological principle. Narratives – since they have to use good arguments – 
are certainly not arbitrary and thus unscientific. What has to be done, however, in a very se-
rious way is to demonstrate that the story or plot being offered is better and more convincing 
than alternative plots and stories. In this context the application of „counterfactuals“ could be 
helpful. Although I know that counterfactuals are criticized within the social sciences for some 
good reasons, one should not neglect the usefulness of such constructions since they might 
help in the process of justifying theoretical stories (Fox Gotham/Staples 1996, 484). „What 
would have happened if“-questions are useful either to find theoretically ambitious questions 
or to refute theoretical schemes which are often quite handy for social scientists keen to 
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bridge long time periods in a story of path dependence. As Richard Ned Lebow has convinc-
ingly argued, the value of counterfactuals“ is based on their tendency to qualify deterministic 
assumptions concerning past causalities (Lebow 2000, 557). Especially if one takes Michel 
Dobry’s advice seriously, namely to interpret contingent events not exclusively by the end-
results of a process, then counterfactuals can help to find out whether the results could have 
emerged by other events as well, by a different path. Could the end-result of a process not 
have emerged without the originally discovered contingent event which at first looked like the 
decisive precondition of the process? It goes without saying that counterfactual narratives 
have to be used carefully, that they are only useful if developed out of research which tried to 
look deep into historical details and if they are able to name a mechanism which makes it 
plausible that the later result at least could have been caused by it. If these two conditions 
are not fulfilled, then counterfactuals are quite useless, arbitrary and even misleading. 
Since the usefulness of counterfactuals is highly contested in the social sciences, I would like 
to reformulate my argument with the help of late British philosopher Bernard Williams. Wil-
liams has answered the question whether fictions might be useful for explanations by point-
ing to Robert Nozick’s distinction between potential explanations with a defect concerning the 
causal law on the one side and those with a defect concerning the facts on the other. Wil-
liams’s point is that some potential explanations with some factual deficits, but with a correct 
law, are useful exactly because they show that a certain kind of process at least could have 
been possible (Williams 2003, 54). Such explanations in which some facts are problematic 
(because they are, for example, not in the historical record), but with a clear causal mecha-
nism, Williams called „imaginary genealogies“. They help the researcher to find a functional 
connection and even to formulate a functional explanation with the help of motives the his-
torical actors might have had (Williams 2003: 58). This is not an argument for an all-
encompassing explanatory functionalism in the social sciences – as Williams makes clear. It 
is just a means to think about the relationship between historical facts and history on the one 
side and theoretical abstractions on the other (Williams 2003: 59f.) in order to immunize one-
self against one-dimensional narratives so common within civilizational analysis and re-
search based on the idea of path-dependency. Counterfactuals and imaginary genealogies – 
to stress it again – can in fact be useful in criticizing teleological assumptions. 
4. If – as emphasized by Paul Ricoeur – narratives are the means of coming to terms 
with human temporality, then it is clear that such temporality must not be neglected within 
social research. But – as especially Andrew Abbott has forcefully argued – this is exactly the 
case in much of statistical research in the social sciences since it is supposed that variables 
do have the same causal effect regardless of social context and timing (Abbott 2001a, 44; 
Isaac 1997, 8). Sequencing effects are all too rarely taken into consideration by statistical 
work. But this is certainly not a problem of quantitative research alone. I would argue that 
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works within historical sociology and civilizational analysis do implicitly agree with the prem-
ise of causal constancy since it is assumed that certain patterns of social reality are repro-
duced by the same causal mechanisms in different social and temporal contexts. The use of 
Mill’s methods of difference and agreement, for example, is the very attempt to isolate con-
text-neutral variables and mechanisms. But it is highly questionable whether such a research 
strategy really is an adequate method in dealing with the highly contingent temporal ordering 
of events so typical of social reality. As William H. Sewell has argued: „A fully eventful con-
ception of temporality must also deny the assumption that causal structures are uniform 
through time. Events must be assumed to be capable of changing not only the balance of 
causal forces operating but the very logic by which consequences follow from occurrences or 
circumstances. A fully eventful account of the fate of nobles in the French Revolution, for 
example, would have to argue that nobles lost power not only because the loss of some of 
their assets – land, tax privileges, feudal dues, offices – reduced their resources relative to 
those of other classes but also because the rules of the social and political game were radi-
cally redefined, making what had previously been a prime asset – their noble status – into a 
powerful liability by the time of the Terror [P] Because the causalities that operate in social 
relations depend at least in part on the contents and relations of cultural categories, events 
have the power to transform social causality.” (1996, 263) 
If one could agree with Sewell’s statement, then one has to be extremely careful in trying to 
generalize mechanisms which one has found in a particular research project, then one 
should at least be sceptical concerning the hope that such a certain mechanism could be 
found in completely different contexts. Although I would not deny that some kind of knowl-
edge accumulation is possible within comparative historical research especially if it turns out 
that some story elements could be convincingly found in various contexts, one has to be 
aware of the following point: Every theoretical narrative by setting some contingent starting 
and endpoints of a development commits some kind of a „selection bias“ – to use the termi-
nology of quantitative researchers. Thus, the question will always be whether mechanisms 
being found can really be generalized (Büthe 2002, 488), especially if it is true, that it is the 
context which determines the causal validity of events and thus the temporal dynamics of 
processes. Therefore we should remain sceptical towards daring generalizations and – in-
stead – should be open towards qualifying our own theoretical plots; we should be prepared 
to see altogether completely different explanatory stories as those we originally have found. 
To be more specific: I do not think that systematic comparisons between civilizations can 
really help us in generating theoretical generalizations. The comparative method in the field 
of civilizational analysis – so my argument would be – does only make sense if it is pursued 
with the intent of individualizing the cases analysed. 
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Let me briefly conclude: Whoever acknowledges the validity of the four points just mentioned 
should be extremely careful in doing civilizational analysis. Having said that, I certainly do not 
want to suggest that civilizational analysis is a fruitless endeavour. On the contrary: Within 
macrosociological research of the last 30 years this approach is certainly one of the most 
promising. However, it should also be recognized that sweeping generalizations are not to be 
expected and they shouldn’t even be tried because otherwise the danger of violating sound 
methodological principles is simply too high. At the moment my advice for those doing cilivi-
zational research would be the following: Since the concept of “civilization” is highly con-
tested a wise methodological strategy still is: (methodological) triangulation: Arguments on 
particular civilizations, let’s say on US-American civilization, should be supplemented and 
corrected by alternative approaches: Arguments coming out of the fields of Global history, 
Atlantic history, Hemispheric History etc. are certainly able to undermine the somewhat teleo-
logical bias of civilizational analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
